Abstract-In cyber-physical additive manufacturing systems, side-channel attacks have been used to reconstruct the G/M-code (which are instructions given to a manufacturing system) of 3D objects being produced. This method is effective for stealing intellectual property from an organization, through least expected means, during prototyping stage before the product goes through a large-scale fabrication and comes out in the market. However, an attacker can be far from being able to completely reconstruct the G/M-code due to lack of enough information leakage through the side-channels. In this paper, we propose a novel way to amplify the information leakage and thus boost the chances of recovery of G/M-code by surreptitiously altering the compiler. By using this compiler, an adversary may easily control various parameters to magnify the leakage of information from a 3D printer while still producing the desired object, thus remaining hidden from the authentic users. This type of attack may be implemented by strong attackers having access to the tool chain and seeking high level of stealth. We have implemented such a compiler and have demonstrated that it increases the success rate of recovering G/M-codes from the four side-channels (acoustic, power, vibration, and electromagnetic) by up to 39% compared to previously proposed attacks.
INTRODUCTION
C YBER-physical systems (CPS) have been recognized as the enabler of the fourth industrial revolution (Industry 4.0) [1] . Due to the tight integration of the cyber and the physical world [2] , [3] , CPS allows us to enhance our interaction with the physical world around us. In fact, with CPS as the foundation, Industry 4.0 is estimated to create a global GDP value of $15 trillion by 2030 [4] . This forecast however does not consider the challenges [2] associated with a pervasive diffusion of CPS in every aspect of our lives, including the most sensitive and critical ones. One of the major challenges which designers have to address is to ensure the secure and reliable operation of these systems [5] , [6] .
One of the fundamental properties which security has to guarantee is confidentiality. A breach in confidentiality will cause significant economic damages. This is true when the lost information is, for instance, an Intellectual Property (IP). Overall, loosing IP will increase the financial loss in the manufacturing sector. The problem of guaranteeing confidentiality of the IP has been extensively studied by the research community, also related to the field of CPS [7] , [8] . Interestingly, the confidentiality of IPs built using additive manufacturing, can be broken by exploiting side channel information for reconstructing the G/M-Code used by 3D printers to generate the objects [9] , [10] . G/M-codes are instructions sent to the 3D printer to control its motion and the machine parameters. The digital process chain of the 3D Printer involves various steps to compile the G/M-codes (see Fig. 1 ). The first step is the creation of the 3D model. This model is designed using a Computer Aided Design (CAD) tools, which produce a StereoLithography File (STL) consisting of 3D coordinates for the description of the model. In the next step, Computer Aided Manufacturing (CAM) tools (G/Mcode compiler) such as slicing and toolpath generation, takes the STL files, slices them layer by layer, and finds the most efficient route to traverse through a single layer. This route is then translated to G/M-codes and sent to the 3D printers. These codes are then interpreted by the 3D printer firmware to produce the physical objects.
3D printers, as any other systems, leak information through side-channels. Side channels such as acoustic or electromagnetic [11] , [12] , [13] for instance, are depending on the specific action being performed, and, ultimately, to the object being printed. Exploiting this relation, it is possible to reverse engineer the models sent to the 3D printer and reconstruct the generating file (such as STL files, G/M-codes, etc.,). Additionally, the information collected with side-channels allows one to gain information about the process and machine parameters [9] . Since 3D printers used for actual fabrication and rapid prototyping, leaking information about the printed object would allow the adversary to gain all the information needed to replicate it, thus will cause a significant financial loss for the involved company. However, the reconstruction of the original files can be very difficult, since an attacker is required to precisely record the signals emitted in the side-channels of the 3D printer.
Motivational Example
The approach in this paper is similar to the one used in other domains, where the addition of trojan, malware or alteration of the system's software to leak information from the covert channels have been shown to be an effective form of attack. Authors in [14] inserted malware in a system to convert the hard disk drive's LED to leak sensitive data from air-gapped computers. Authors in [15] demonstrate how hardware trojan can enhance the information leakage from the power side-channel.
Our Novel Contributions
In this paper, we introduce and demonstrate a novel and powerful attack where an adversary alters the compiler to increase the amount of information leaked during the prototyping process. This can significantly simplify a reverse engineering attack carried out by exploiting the sidechannels. We have systematically analyzed this stronger attack scenario by dividing this paper into multiple sections. The first section will explain how the side channels can be exploited to get information about the G/M codes. The next two sections will explain our new attack model and how the compiler can be modified to increase the leakage consecutively. And finally, we demonstrate how the G/M codes can be reconstructed by using the mutual information that we have calculated by exploiting the side channels.
With this work, we aim at demonstrating the feasibility of cross-domain attack model, where an attacker introduces a change of cyber-domain variables to increase the amount of information leakage in the physical domain. We believe that this type of attacks is not yet explored in depth by the scientific community, especially in the context of cyberphysical systems. The work presented here one step towards the exploration and complete understanding of this novel attack model, which we believe will be very relevant in the near future, when cyber-physical devices will completely pervade our lives. For demonstration, we have implemented the proposed attack model in Fused Deposition Modeling (FDM) technique based 3D desktop printers.
INFORMATION LEAKAGE THROUGH SIDE CHAN-NELS OF 3D PRINTER
From the high level view point, any 3d printer has software (e.g. G/M codes), electronics (controller, stepper motors etc.) and mechanics (axis motion, belt, and pulleys etc.) and these are highly correlated with each other from information theory approach. The G/M codes can be partitioned into sets depending upon the mechanics e.g. nozzle speed, an angle of the line segment etc (see section 4.3). And, side channels are selected in such a way that each of them has shared mutual information with each of the partitioned G/M codes. And the compiler is tempered in such a way to reduce the homogeneous nature of the side channel data to increase the information gain. The side channels which have coupled information with the mechanics are stated below.
Electromagnetic (EM):
The earth's magnetic field is deviated by the movement of printer's metallic structure (i.e. extruders, belt, and pulleys, etc.) and also by the electromagnet of the stepper motors. This is known as magnetic deviation and accurate model for this non-linear effect is complex. Data-driven modeling of this deviation can model the movement of the metallic structure and from this, G/M codes which are directly involved with the movement of the metallic structure can be reconstructed. This information leakage can be enhanced by using the G/M code such as M566 which is used to control the speed at the end of the line segments.
Power:
Most of the state-of-the-art desktop 3D printers use two-phase hybrid stepper motors which generate torque to move the nozzle. The generation of torque depends upon the load i.e. the shape of the object. On the other hand, the torque generated in the motor is proportional to the magnetic flux (T αH) generated in the stator winding which also depends upon the power provided to the stepper motor (H α I). So, there is a correlation between the shape of the geometry and power data of the motor. For example, this mutual information in the power data can be increased by changing the G/M-codes M17, M18, which control the motor power. 3. Vibration: 3D printers have four stepper motors. Three of them are used to move the printer nozzle in each of the X, Y and Z axis [16] and the fourth motor is used to extrude the filament while printing. These motors generate vibration due to the fluctuating radial force acting on the stator core in different axes. This vibration has mutual information of the direction of movement of the nozzle which can be modeled by collecting the vibration side channel data. This mutual information is necessary to reconstruct the G/M code sets which directly control the movement of the nozzle in different axes and this information gain can be enhanced by increasing the vibration of the motor in a controlled manner by altering the compiler (e.g. M 566).
Acoustic:
The acoustic side-channel is closely related to the vibration of the body and the speed of the motors. Fig.2 shows, with the increase of the motor speed (from 500 mm/min to 4800 mm/min), the higher frequency components are gradually introduced into the audio spectrum [13] . So, by tweaking the G/M code (e.g. M204), the speed of the motor can be increased at the line end which in turn leaks information about the IP through the acoustic side channel.
ATTACK MODEL DESCRIPTION
In previously proposed side channel attacks on 3D printers [11] , [12] , [13] , an attacker is motivated to steal the Intellectual Property (IP) inherent in the 3D object printed by the designer (Fig. 3) . In this paper, we envision a stronger attacker, having the same motivation, as the previous ones, but having also access to the tool chain used during 3D printing. The IP target of the attack, ultimately consists into the design file of the printed object, which is stolen by the adversary in the form of various parameters such as geometry, process parameters, machine parameters [9] .
Since side channel attacks do not require alteration in the devices themselves, or do not require other invasive alteration such as access to the network, they could be harder to be identified and prevented. These attack can be carried out by malicious employees having access to the location where printing is carried out, but incapable of having access to the design files, to make an illegitimate copy. It has been shown that these types of side-channels attacks can be successfully used to reconstruct information about the IP being printed by 3D printers used for prototyping [11] , [12] , [13] , [17] , [18] .
As usually done in template attacks, during the training phase, the attacker will characterize the G/M-code by extracting various time and frequency domain features from various side channels by using a device similar to the one which will be target of the attack. These data will be used to train and create a model to link the G/M-code with the related analog emissions. As this training is done using a 3D printer similar to the target one, the attacker may create models also using advanced machine learning algorithms (e.g. random forests [19] or neural networks [20] ) improving the accuracy of the model and, ultimately, improving the attack. The reconstructed G/M-codes are partial, as will be explained in Section 4.During an attack phase, the adversary acquires these analog emissions by non-intrusively monitoring the side-channels by surreptitiously placing sensors such as microphones and accelerometers and use the previously trained classifier to reconstruct the partial G/Mcodes, and eventually reconstruct the whole design file of the printed object. However, as shown in Fig. 3 , because of the low entropy in the latent space, this approach may not accurately predict the partial G/M-codes for complex designs. An attacker may therefore reconstruct G/M-codes that do not completely matches the printed 3D object.
Our New Stronger Attack Model
In current attack model, it is assumed that adversaries do Fig. 3 . Example of side-channel attack on cyber-physical manufacturing system [11] , [12] , [13] .
not have any access to the software compilation toolchain. However, this situation is rapidly changing. Since stronger attacker now is capable of combining design alterations (such as hardware Trojans), it is important to study this realistic attack model in depth (previous works [21] for instance, demonstrated the possibility of increasing the side channel leakage of a protected logic style by altering the doping polarity of logic gates). Threats coming from design tools are realistic since they are gaining importance also in other fields of security [22] , [23] . In our context, we consider an adversary which has the possibility of altering the design tools used to produce the file to be printed, and combine this modification with side channel attacks to recover in a much easier way the design file. 
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Possible Ways of Tempering The Tool Chain
In our attack model (Fig. 4) , the attackers only need to modify and change the tool chain once, whereby they add malicious altered codes, that increase the information leakage through the side-channels without hampering the normal operation of the 3D printer. Most of these desktop 3D printers used for prototyping use open source CAD, CAM and firmware which are easily accessible by an attacker [24] , [25] . The alteration of the tool chain can be possible in at least three scenarios. In the first one, the tool provider or the printer manufacturer introduces the malicious modifications in tool chain or in the firmware of the printer and the modification would be present in all the printing files. This threat is similar to the threat model for hardware trojans previously mentioned, where a trojan, inserted by a malicious foundry, alter the side-channel robustness of a chip by weakening the countermeasure. In the second scenario, a malicious employee which has access to the source code of the fabrication tool chain or the firmware (most of them being open source for desktop 3D printers), maliciously modify them. Modification of the tool chain might be more appealing forms of cyber-attacks, than a simple copy of design files (example CAD design), since they are much stealthier and more difficult to detect. Thus, they could leave the possibility to reverse engineering designs for much longer time without the knowledge of the company. The third scenario is interdiction, which has been rumored to be used in the past [26] , [27] , [28] and have been recently proven to be practically feasible [29] . In this scenario, a competitor can intercept the printing device during the delivery, modify the compiler or the firmware and then proceed with the shipping to the customer. In this case, the main reason to increase the side-channel of the printing process instead of injecting other type of modifications is mainly due to the stealth of the attack and to the (almost) impossibility of demonstrating the malicious nature of the modifications.
Motivational Experiment: Increase of Information Leakage
A basic idea in information theory is that homogeneous events have less information than the less deterministic events. This paper uses this idea. To prove that compiler modification can increase the information leakage by reducing the homogeneous nature of the side channels, we have done a motivational experiment on our existing setup. We know that the surface texture of an object made by a 3D printer is a direct function of the flow rate from the nozzle. By extracting various time and frequency domain features from side channels which have leaked information of the surface texture (e.g. thickness, dimension), datadriven modeling approach such as Random Forest regressor is used to model the relationship between the surface texture of the created object and flow rate from the nozzle. Now, the quality of the surface texture is predicted from this datadriven model and found that the prediction error is reduced while the flow rate is increased as shown in Fig. 5 . In a 3D printer, the optimal flow rate lies in the range of 80% to 120%. This flow rate is varied from 20% to 200% of the optimal flow rate with the step-size of 10% by altering code M108 in the tool chain. From Fig. 5 , it is clear that the mean prediction error is reduced with the increase of the flow rate. We can mathematically explain this in the following way. If X = {Modified compiler instruction}, Y = {Collected side channel data}, conditional entropy can be written as H(Y|X) = H(X,Y) -H(X). Here, H(Y|X) is greater than H(Y) as joint entropy, H(X,Y) is increased because of the introduction of X. As the increase of flow rate (i.e. alteration of M codes) increases the joint entropy of the design latent space which in turn increases mutual information.
In this paper, to demonstrate the feasibility of attacks maximizing the information leakage through the sidechannels, we have targeted the CAM tool (Section 4 ), which compiles the G/M-codes from the STL file. By incorporating altered codes, we will demonstrate that an attacker may improve their success rate for predicting the partial If their physical implementation (the load carried, the framework to hold the stepper motor, etc.) is the same then they will give off analog emissions, such as acoustics, that are quite similar. This will make differentiating the angle variation between the X and Y movements a non-trivial task. In such a scenario, an attacker may utilize an altered compiler to reveal the angle information by introducing code that triggers each time the angle changes. For example, it can be done by slightly changing the speed of the nozzlecooling fan every time the angle changes without it being perceptible to the user.
COMPILER ATTACK
The overview of our attack is depicted in Fig. 6 . An attack aiming at reconstructing the G/M-code starting from sidechannel analysis consists of two phase: a profiling phase, and an attack phase. In the following part of this section we will explain these two phases in details.
Profiling Phase
In the profiling phase, an adversary is assumed to have access to the target device or to an identical replica of the target device. This profiling phase is similar to the profiling carried out during the template attacks [30] , which have been proven by previous research as being an extremely powerful form of side-channel attack [30] . Using the n training G/Mcodes,
. . , g n ], the adversary can characterize m side-channels, S m = {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m }. From each side-channel they are able to observe the analog emissions represented by random variables
We represent these emissions with random variables as we would like to increase the leakage by maximizing the Fig. 6 . The proposed compiler attack: the adversary identifies the variables controlling the 3D printers capable of maximizing the side-channel leakage, then produces an altered compiler capable of generating G/M-codes maximizing these leakages by modifying the use of these variables. When needed, the adversary recovers the IP produced by the 3D printer with an easier side-channel attack.
mutual information between the emissions and design variables (see section 4.3). An attacker collects data from each of these side-channels, filters them, and extracts several time and frequency domain features (let's say l features in total). For each of the side-channel an attacker eventually obtains the following matrix for each side-channel:
in is the value of the random variable O i for sidechannel S i , n is the total emission data collected, and l represents the total features extracted from the emission data. Although different number of features can be extracted from each of the side-channels, here we assume that similar and equal number of features are extracted. Depending on the attacker, they may use uni-variate or multi-variate analysis to estimate a model functionM that approximates the relation between the side-channel emission and the cyberdata. We assume that an attacker has unlimited access to the system closely representing the target 3D printer, such that they can acquire large samples of analog emission O i corresponding to the G/M-code G i to accurately estimate the model functions using machine learning algorithms. As mentioned, these assumptions have proven to be realistic by the amount of literature dealing with template attacks. The model function can simply be chosen as a function with k values which satisfies the following criteria:
Where, k = 1, 2, . . . , N is the number of various model functions (such as neural networks, random forests, support-vector machines, etc. ) used to estimate the model function. The model function is trained to estimate the G-code,ĝ i =f k (o i , φ), given the corresponding analog emissions. φ = {φ 1 , φ 2 , φ 3 , . . . , φ t } is a vector of parameters used to tune the model function. Corresponding to the model function used (indexed by k in equation 2), length t and value of φ is determined. We carried out the profiling phase in a relatively protected environment, keeping the printer in a room which was not accessed during the whole phase. However, the room was separated from the rest of the environment only by a closed door, thus possible noise coming from outside could have been included in the model. The printer was placed on a regular table, with no support for attenuation of vibrations. Power and electromagnetic measurements have also been carried out on the regular device operating in a non-insulated environment. We believe that a profiling carried out in a much more insulated environment would lead to better results, since it would place the attacker into a more ideal situation. However, since we are interested in the real impact of the proposed attack, we constructed our setup in a way to mimic the setup which an adversary could easily mount using relatively inexpensive equipment. As in any template attack, the closer is the profiling setup with the target one, the higher are the chances of success. However, the attack we propose here aims to amplify the leakage of information, thus making easier to be detected by an adversary also when the profiling setup is very different from the attack one.
Attack Phase
During the attack phase, the model function m : G → O orf k (., φ) acquired from Equation 2, is used to re-construct the G/M-code. The model function is estimated using various algorithms (such as neural networks, random forests, support-vector machines, etc. ). For each of these algorithms k, we select the function that gives the least analog emission to G-code estimation error. An attacker has to acquire all the analog signals from the side-channels to estimate the complete G/M-code. The accuracy of the estimated function determines the accuracy of the attack. In most of the attacks, the reconstruction of the G/M-code is done using multiple model functions, each responsible for estimating
This partition is based on the fact the each instruction of G/M-code is responsible for accomplishing multiple actuation at the same time (for example determining angle and length of the line segment being printed). Hence, we can decompose such G/M-code further into smaller control actions. Then we have model func-
collectively estimate the G/M-code. This is especially true in additive manufacturing, because the IP is hidden in the geometry of an object, and the main information that reveals the geometry of the object while printing are: travel feed-rate of the nozzle, angle of the line segment, distance movement in each axis, etc. This information is present in G/M-code along with other information. Hence, only subset of {Q 1 , Q 2 , Q 3 , . . . , Q r } maybe required to reconstruct the geometry. Also, different side-channels reveal different sets of information about the G/M-code.
However, reconstructing the G/M-code can be problematic considering that the attacker, in a real scenario, might not have access to an environment where it is possible to collect noise-free samples of each side-channel emission.
To improve the situation, we envision a stronger attacker, which is capable of modifying and producing G/M-code via compiler to maximize the leakage of information via side-channels. In fact, by modifying computer aided manufacturing tools (such as slicing algorithm and tool-path generation algorithm), an attacker can easily introduce variation in the design variables {α 1 , α 2 , α 3 , . . . , α n }, such that the estimated model functionsf k (., φ) can more accurately reconstruct the G/M-code.
Compiler Modification
In this work, to maliciously modify the compiler, we identified three ways which can be used to increase information leakage without affecting the normal operation of the 3D printer. These variables are machine specific. In detail, the variables which we used are:
1. Fan Speed (A 1 ): The machine code M 106 controls the fan speed and also controls the temperature of the nozzle. The fan speed can vary within the scale from 0 to 255. A slight change in the fan speed can increase the entropy within the acoustic, magnetic, power and vibration side-channels which makes it easier to extract the time and frequency domain features. These changes in the fan speed must not cause the temperature of the nozzle to negatively impact the smooth flow of materials which is considered in the altered compiler.
2. Speed at the End of Line Segment (A 2 ): In order to reverse engineer, an attacker needs to reconstruct each line segment that is used in printing the 3D object layer by layer. Hence, by varying the speed at the end of the line segment using M 566, an attacker can increase the speed variation (i.e. increasing information gain) drastically between two line segments, allowing them to decipher the change of the line. However, the speed variation cannot be large to cause mechanical shock or hamper the deposition of the material through the nozzle.
3. Power to Stepper Motors (A 3 ): M-codes M 17 powers all the stepper motors, whereas M 18 disables all the stepper motors. This variable can be used to enhance the information leakage in the power and electromagnetic sidechannels. However, the stepper motors should be turned onoff quickly so it does not affect the operation while affecting the side-channels enough to reveal certain information.
There are several other G/M-codes that may be used to optimally leak information from the side-channels without the knowledge of the legitimate user such as M108 to set extruder speed, M113 to set extruder's Pulse Width Modulation, M140 to set printing bed temperature, M204 to set the acceleration of stepper motors, etc. Here, we only present few for proving the effectiveness of our attack model.
To quantify the amount of information leaked from the side-channels, we use as metric the mutual information between the partitioned G/M-code Q r and the observed analog emission in each of the side-channels. Intuitively, the mutual information indicates how much information of a specific G/M-code Q r is available if the analog emission O m is known. We denote the discrete random variable with the capital letter O, Q, G and the values taken by these random variables with the small letters o, g, q. Although the value of analog emissions from the side-channels maybe calculated using the first principle based equations describing the physical characteristics of the system, this step is nontrivial. Instead, we represent such analog emission as random variables and observe its realization using the sensors. Moreover, depending on the 3D object being printed, slicing algorithms, process parameters, etc., different G/M-code can be passed to the 3D printer. Since we do not assume an attacker to know the 3D object or process parameters beforehand, we treat these G/M-code being passed to the 3D printer as random variables with some underlying distribution. The mutual information is then defined as [31] :
Where p(q r , o m ) is the joint probability distribution function, and p(q r ) and p(o m ) marginal probability distribution for the random variables Q r and O m . The joint probability function may be calculated using training G/M-codes consisting of range of uniformly distributed values for Q r and collecting the corresponding analog emissions from the sidechannels. Since we have used base 2 for the logarithm, the unit of the mutual information is bits.
Transformations for Leakage Maximization
As mentioned earlier, the proposed attack consists of two phases: first, a profiling phase and second, an attack phase. The profiling phase is carried out only once, and it is done for two reasons. The first one, is to understand how and where to inject the malicious modification in the compiler (or in the firmware of the printer), the second is to build the templates which will be used to reconstruct the code during the second phase of the attack. During the profiling phase, the attacker estimates the model function. Based on the model function, the mutual information between the analog signals and the G/M-code is computed along with the accuracy of the reconstructed G/M-code. Then, various design variables are explored, and the ones that could maximize the mutual information for a given side-channel without affecting the normal operation of the 3D printer are modified accordingly. The altered compiler is then inserted into the design chain of the additive manufacturing system to produce G/M-codes that can be easily reconstructed by an adversary.
The goal of the attacker is maximizing the side-channel information. To do so in a systematic way, we develop a mutual information maximization algorithm. Our algorithm takes the current mutual information value between the partial G/M-code Q r and the analog emissions O and maximizes the information available. 14 Optimize arg max (α i j )fij (.) 15 return {αm 1 , αm 2 , . . . , αm n } Algorithm 1 performs the mutual information maximization. The input to the algorithm are the considered design variables {A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n }. For each of the design variables, the algorithm returns values {α m1 , α m2 , . . . , α mn } that maximize the amount of mutual information in each of the m side-channels. From lines 1 to 8, the algorithm collects the data for estimating the joint probability distribution function in line 9. Using this joint probability function, along with the entropy of the analog emissions and the predetermined partitioned G/M-codes Q r used for profiling, the conditional mutual information based on the value of each design variable is calculated in line 10. Then a nonlinear functionf mn (.) is used to estimate the relation between the mutual information and the values of the design variables in line 11. Then for each of the design variables and the side-channels, an optimization algorithm is used that maximizes the amount of the mutual information in each of the side-channels. The constraints for the optimization algorithm are: (a) maintain the printing time T p ≤ T I + T , where T I is original printing time and T is the allowed threshold for time variation, (b) avoid large variation in nozzle temperature θ I − θ L ≤ θ p ≤ θ I + θ H where θ I is original temperature and θ L , θ H is the allowed lower and upper threshold for temperature variation, (c) avoid large speed fluctuation ϑ I − ϑ ≤ ϑ p ≤ ϑ I + ϑ where ϑ I is original printing speed and ϑ is the allowed threshold for speed variation, (d) and not keep stepper motors idle for a longer than period of time T IDLE ≤ IDLE where IDLE is the allowed idle time without causing the stepper motors to move freely. To obtain these thresholds, an attacker first needs to find the optimal value of these parameters θ p , ϑ p , T IDLE , and T I . These parameters can easily be accessed if the attacker has a profiling 3D printer which is similar to the target 3D printer. For some of the parameters, the optimal range of the values are given in the user manual. However, an attacker may go beyond the optimal range by increasing or decreasing the threshold and analyzing its corresponding effects on quality of the 3D objects.
The second phase of the attack is a classical template side-channel attack. To carry out that, the adversary need to have physical access to the device during the printing process. The type of access required depends on the particular "channel" that the adversary wants to exploit. For power, a complex and likely to be visible measurements setup maybe required. For acoustic, vibration, and EM sidechannel attacks, simple modern smart phones [11] have been demonstrated to have the potential to be sufficient to reconstruct the whole G/M-code. After the channel traces are collected, the adversary will attempt to reconstruct the G/M-code using a model function estimated during the profiling phase. Our experimental setup is shown in Fig. 7 . We have used a Cartesian desktop 3D printer (Printrbot) which uses FDM technique for printing. In order to monitor the analog emissions from the side-channels we have used three acoustic sensors (Audio-Technica AT2021), AC/DC current clamp (PIC0 TA018), magnetic field sensor (HMC5883L), and accelerometer (uxcell ADXL335). The acoustic sensors are placed in X,Y, and Z-axes perpendicular to each other, the vibration sensor is placed at the base of the 3D printer, magnetic sensor is placed on the table close to the 3D printer, and the power sensor is clamped in power cable between the power supply and the 3D printer. Data acquisition from all the side-channels is done using National Instruments data acquisition hardware (NI USB-6229). The collected analog emissions are then processed in Matlab (R2015b). To measure the change in the mutual information caused by changing various parameters, we have created line segment with multiple layers and angle to the X-axis. For calculating the success-rate, we have used polygons with various sides and height without infill as our test objects. We have implemented the first and second phase of the proposed attack model in the same 3D printer.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Acoustic
We partition the G/M-codes into three sets. An attacker capable of reconstructing these subsets of G/M-codes accurately is able to reconstruct any line segment being printed by the 3D printer at any instance of time.
1. Angle of the Line Segment (Q 1 ): Each instruction of the G/M-code moves the nozzle of the 3D printer from point of origin to the point of destination making a line segment. Since, an object is printed layer wise, most of these line segments lie in the XY − plane. Hence, we define the angle made by the line segment with the X − axis as one of the variables of the G/M-code.
Change of Layer (Q 2 ):
When the 3D printer is done printing on one layer, it moves to another layer. Each G/Mcode consists of information on which layer it is printing on. Hence, we define Q 2 as the variable that determines the change of layer.
Change of Line Segment (Q 3 ):
The change of line segment is not directly derived from the G/M-code, but rather from the analog emissions acquired when a G/Mcode instruction begins and ends. We specify this variable as Q 3 .
These three variables are not an exhaustive partitions of the G/M-code. However, they are enough to trace the nozzle movement, and determine the geometry of the 3D-object being printed, as in conjunction, these variables define the vector of line segments that make up each layer, define various layers, and finally assign the analog emissions to specific G/M-code instructions.
The information leakage can be arbitrarily increased without making the alteration of compiler understandable. To do so, we empirically determined the values of threshold and provided them as the constraints to the optimization algorithm. We selected the threshold values as follows: (a) T =1% of the T I , we assume that 1% printing time is not noticeable for any object being printed. (b) θ L =10 o and
The thermoplastic extruded in the given 3D printer is a PolyLactic Acid (PLA), which is a bio-polymer with melting temperature between 180 o to 220 o [32] . The original printing temperature for given 3D printer is normally set at 205
o . Hence, this gives the compiler some room for changing the fan speed without compromising the printing quality. (c) ϑ = 10% of the normal printing speed, which is not large enough to cause jerky motions but may cause the analog emissions to be noticeable in the side-channels. (d) we assigned IDLE ≤ 30 ms for minimizing the free movement of stepper motors. The compiler alteration attack is compared with the attack methodologies used in [11] , [12] , [13] , where side-channel data are collected and models are trained to predict various G/M-code information.
Accuracy Metric: A better metric to evaluate the effectiveness of our attack is success rate of an attacker. Intuitively, the success rate measures the capability of an adversary to recover the G/M-code (or part of it with certain error threshold) given a specific leakage and, contrary to the mutual information, is dependent on the specific attack scenario. Let us assume that any side-channel S ∈ {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m } leaks a subset of information Q ⊆ Q with Q = {Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . , Q t }. Where t ≤ r and t ∈ Z >0 , with r being possible number of disjoint sets into which the G/Mcode can be partitioned into. We assume that this subset of information is able to explain the geometry of the 3D object. Let us define a variable e i , such that e i = 1 when |q ri −m r (o mi , .)| ≤ e , and 0 otherwise. Where e ∈ R is the error threshold for which the estimated partial G/Mcode can be used to reconstruct the complete G/M-code. Ideally, the error threshold for reconstruction should be close to the process variation for an attacker to have full reconstruction capability. However, to demonstrate that the success rate can be improved by utilizing the subtle compiler alteration, the error threshold is fixed with reference to the accuracy of one of the most powerful side-channel for the given 3D printer (determined experimentally). Let's say from the experiment we obtain four error thresholds ea , ev , em , and ep for acoustic, vibration, EM, and power side-channels, respectively for each partial G/Mcodes, that gives us more than 75% success rate in reconstruction. Then we chose the smallest e , for calculating the success rate for all the side-channels as well. For each model functionm r (.), estimated for the side-channel S , we define partial success rate in estimating a portion of G/M-code Q t as follows:
Where N gives the total number of G/M-code instructions used in describing the 3D model. However, in calculating the total success rate, the consideration is given for accurate estimation of all the partial G/M-code. Hence, an attacker is successful in reconstructing the G/M-code if and only if e i1 = 1, e i2 = 1, . . . , e it = 1. Where e ij is the error while estimating j th partial G/M-code for i th instruction. With this the total success rate for the given side-channel S can be written as follows:
For each of the side-channels and the partitioned G/Mcode, we measure the amount of information leaked and the corresponding success rate of the estimated model functionŝ m r (.). Then, we incorporate our mutual information maximization algorithm to modify the design variables and see the corresponding changes in the success-rate of the same estimated model function. In quantifying the leakage, we extract power spectral density as a feature over the range of 0 Hz to 10 KHz evenly distributed at an interval 20 Hz due to the fact that the emissions are with in this range during initial spectral analysis, and 20 Hz interval resolution is able to capture the variation in the frequency domain), perform Principle Component Analysis (PCA) on the feature set this will make it possible to transform the correlated frequency components into uncorrelated principle components, and reduce the dimension for the attack model, and present the mutual information of the highest principle component. In order to measure the mutual information for each of the partitioned G/M-code {Q 1 , Q 2 , Q 3 }, we need to calculate the corresponding analog emissions signals. Hence, in our experiment, for the angle (Q 1 ), we have varied the angle from 0 o to 360 o at an step angle of 9 o . We, assume Q 1 is a random variable with uniform distribution. Hence, its total entropy will be log 2 (40) 5.32 bits. Random variable Q 2 and Q 3 only have two possible values, whether the layer changed or not, and whether it is the same line segment or a different one. Hence, their entropy is log 2 (2) = 1 bits. For demonstration purpose, the training data consisted of line segments varying in angle, layer (10 layers) and direction (by printing line segments in opposite directions). Mutual Information: The mutual information is calculated for each partial G/M-code {Q 1 , Q 2 , Q 3 } (shown in Figure 8 , 9 and 10) before and after altering the compiler (the slicing and the tool-path generation tool). These values are calculated based on the joint probability distribution estimated by assuming a uniform distribution for partial G/M-codes, and collecting the corresponding analog emissions from the side-channels. Fig. 8 . Mutual Information between Q 1 and Side-channels before ( [11] , [12] , [13] ) and after altering the Compiler.
In Figure 8 , the mutual information before and after the alteration of the compiler is shown between each of the sidechannels and the partial G/M-code Q 1 . It can be observed that the power side-channel, even though had lower overall mutual information compared to other side-channels, has highest increase (+21.5%) in mutual information after altering the compiler. Vibration side-channel has highest mutual information with the partial G/M-code. This means that more information about Q 1 can be inferred from the vibration side-channel compared to other side-channels. In Figure 9 , the mutual information before and after the alteration of the compiler is shown between each of the sidechannels and the partial G/M-code Q 2 . It can be observed +10.3% Fig. 9 . Mutual Information between Q 2 and Side-channels before ( [11] , [12] , [13] ) and after altering the Compiler.
that the mutual information is highest for electromagnetic side-channel, although increase (+10.3%) in the mutual information after the alteration of the compiler is the lowest for it. Whereas, power side-channel shows large increase in mutual information after the alteration of the compiler (+61.5%). Fig. 10 . Mutual Information between Q 3 and Side-channels before ( [11] , [12] , [13] ) and after altering the Compiler.
Acoustic
Side-Channels
In Figure 10 , the mutual information before and after the alteration of the compiler is shown between each of the side-channels and the partial G/M-code Q 3 . For Q 3 , similar to Q 2 , electromagnetic side-channel has the highest mutual information with increase of mutual information by +26.3% after the compiler alteration. Power side-channel, however, showed significant increase in mutual information. However, compared to the electromagnetic side-channel it has relatively very low mutual information.
We can see that for the partitioned G/M-code Q 1 , the vibration side-channel has most mutual information, whereas the power side-channel has the least. This is due to the fact that angle variation does not affect the constant DC power supply. Compared to the attack models used in [11] , [12] , [13] , the altered compiler increases the mutual information in each of the side-channel. The increase in mutual information for all the side-channels demonstrates that the alteration of the compiler, while does not change the final design, helps attackers to infer original G/M-code more accurately. Contrary to other forms of breaching the confidentiality by accessing the design files, these modifications allow an attacker to obtain the G/M-code in a way which is extremely hard to be detected.
Partial Success Rate:
Before calculating the success rate, the data collected using uniformly distributed partial G/Mcodes is split into 3:1 training and testing set respectively. Then random forest regression algorithm is trained to predict the angle from analog emissions collected from the sidechannels, and random forest classification algorithm is used to predict the layer and line segments changes. Since only the angle is a continuous value, e is set as 3 o based on the vibration side-channel, which provide more than 75% accuracy for prediction with error of ± 3 o . Then the average partial success rate is calculated for individual sidechannels and the partitioned G/M-codes. The results for partial success rate for reconstructing Q 1 , Q 2 , and Q 3 are presented in Figures 11, 12, and 13 , respectively. [12] , [13] and after altering the Compiler.
Side-Channels
In Figure 11 , the partial success rate before and after the alteration of the compiler is shown for the partial G/M-code Q 1 . It can be observed that the vibration side-channel has the highest success rate for reconstructing Q 1 , while only having +6.53% increase in the success rate after alteration of the compiler. Whereas, power side-channel has highest increase in success rate by +75.77%, while having the lowest overall success rate for predicting Q 1 . [11] , [12] , [13] and after altering the Compiler.
In Figure 12 , the partial success rate before and after the alteration of the compiler is shown for the partial G/Mcode Q 2 . It can be observed that the electromagnetic sidechannel has the highest overall success rate. However, the success rate decreased by 0.17%. This maybe due to the fact the success rate is already higher, and change in the design variable does not improve the success rate drastically. The other reason for this could be that, although, the mutual information increased for Q 2 , it only gives the upper bound for inferring about the random variable Q 2 given the analog emissions, and the success rate highly depends on the accuracy of the estimation function (f k (., φ)). And in this experiment, the estimation function is not able to utilize the increase in the mutual information. However, vibration side-channel showed drastic increase in the success rate by 56.05% corresponding to the increase in the mutual information. [12] , [13] and after altering the Compiler.
In Figure 13 , the partial success rate before and after the alteration of the compiler is shown for the partial G/M-code Q 3 . Similar to Q 2 , electromagnetic side-channel gave highest success rate for reconstructing Q 3 . However, increase in success rate after the alteration of the compiler is only 1.46% compared to vibration side-channel, where increase in success rate ( 24.27%) is the highest. Total Success Rate: For calculating the total success rate, we have printed various regular polygons with number of sides ranging from 3 to 12, and measured the accuracy for reconstructing the partial G/M-code information (Q 1 , Q 2 , and Q 3 ). For each polygon, five layers are printed and the side length are varied from 5 mm to 20 mm. Then the prediction is performed based on the model function trained to calculate the partial success rates. Then based on these predictions, Equation 5 is used to calculate the total success rate before and after the compiler is altered. From Figure 14 , we can observe that the total success rate after altering the compiler has increased for all the side-channels. The total success rate is highest for vibration side-channel around 24.27%. However, it has the lowest increase in success rate compared to other side-channels. The power side-channel has the lowest overall success rate, however, it has the highest increase in the success rate (39.71%). Our attack model leaves a large margin to an attacker for finding an optimal combination of mutual information maximization across various side-channels for obtaining increase in success rate, while achieving higher stealth. Hence, combined with the altered compiler, attack models presented in [11] , [12] , [13] can achieve higher reconstruction accuracy for the G/M-code using the proposed attack model. where an attacker may be able to perform one-time access to alter the compiler producing the printing file (or the firmware interpreting it) and, thanks to this, the strengths of side-channel attacks aiming at stealing intellectual property is increased. Contrary to other forms of information leakage, the ones released using side-channels are much more difficult to be identified (and thus stopped). We have demonstrated this by using an altered compiler, the success rate for predicting the objects made of line segments has been improved significantly. However, in order to achieve accurate reconstruction of the 3D objects with arcs, we will incorporate further design variable analysis that an attacker might use. Nonetheless, not all movements are non-linear, and this method will still give partial information about various line segments in the 3D object. Furthermore, we have only presented the analysis on FDM based desktop 3D printers. Higher-end FDM 3D printers may utilize better techniques to reduce the acoustic noise and vibration. Hence, further analysis is required to implement this attack in higher-end 3D printers.
DISCUSSION
Difficulty of Compiler Alteration:
Any form of alteration on the compiler have to be surreptitiously placed to avoid detection. Patched Win-RAR vulnerability have been previously used to manipulate the design files [33] , and compromise the physical structural integrity from the cyberdomain. We assume that an attacker would be interested to steal the IP of the 3D object during the prototyping stage. Currently, there are multiple third-party compiler software that is able to generate the G/M-codes. Although, the desktop 3D printers may not be connected to the internet, the PC that have this software have internet connection. Hence, for altering the compiler an attacker would require both proficiency in hacking skills as well as additive manufacturing process chain knowledge, to introduce subtle changes that would not be noticeable by the user [33] .
Alteration of CAD and Firmware:
We have demonstrated an attack where the compiler of the 3D printer is altered. However, as mentioned in the paper, the principle we propose is valid also for an attacker who wants to alter the firmware or the CAD tool itself to increase the information leaked via side-channel. Hence, in our future work, we will complete our demonstration by altering also the firmware and CAD tools to increase information leakage in the sidechannels.
Combination of Multiple Channels:
In this paper, we considered an attacker which has access to one side channel at the time (or, at least, aims at exploiting one side channel at a time) and aims at maximizing it using an altered compiler. This is a first step into this direction. A future interesting research direction is the to explore the combination of multiple side channel attacks (and the joint increase of side channel leakage). We leave a systematic exploration of this aspect as a future work. Sensor Position: Since an attacker relies on the physical emissions from the side-channels, the position and number of sensors placed may affect the success rate of an attacker. To this regard, an attacker may require to explore multiple sensor positions and number of sensors to improve their success rate. In our experiment, we have performed primitive sensor position by placing the sensors in close proximity from the components responsible for emitting physical emissions. However, more extensive methods need to be explored to figure out the optimal number and position of sensors. We leave this for our future work.
Countermeasures
The proposed attack causes the loss of information using side-channel attacks, could be very hard to be detected, since legitimate users could not be able to perceive any change in the normal operation of the 3D printer (the final object remains unaltered and the printing time also increases by an imperceptible amount). The following countermeasures are proposed:
Reducing Information Leakage Through Side Channels:
In section 3.3, a motivational example has clearly shown that when the flow rate is low, the surface texture can not be predicted easily due to the reduced information leakage. Information leakage can be reduced by increasing the homogeneous nature of the dataset extracted from the side channels. This idea can be adopted with our partitioned G/M codes Q 1 , Q 2 and Q 3 . To make the emission data set homogeneous, redundancy can be added to the G/M codes {Q 1 ,Q 2 ,Q 3 } which can add controlled randomness in the movement of the motors to make the side channel data homogeneous. But this redundancy in the G codes will affect the total printing time by delaying it. In-depth research is required to find the proper efficient algorithm to add randomness to the system while improving security. Regarding counteracting side-channel attacks in general, it is a very hard task. For instance, hiding the side channel signal would require either to generate a side channel signal which is constant (however, it will be very hard to guarantee that each shape is printed using the same amount of time, generating the same noise, producing the same vibrations) or to cover it creating artificial noise to complicate the reconstruction phase. However, this approach is relatively new and requires to be explored much more in depth.
Formal Verification Method of the G/M Codes:
The traditional formal verification methods needs to be used to check the integrity of the G/M-code to make sure that the 3D printer firmwares or CAD and STL files are not compromised.
Golden Reference:
Another approach would be to have a golden reference of an unaltered CAD, CAM and 3D printer Firmware to check any anomalous behavior in the sidechannels. 4. Shielding: Shielding the 3D printer can suppress the electromagnetic radiation as well as sounds coming from the printer. This approach is effective but will add an extra cost to system.
CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a proof of concept for a new attack consisting of a modification of the compiler to generate G/M-codes which allows an easier reconstruction of the printing files using side-channel attacks. We demonstrated how multiple design variables can be used to increase the success rate of the G/M-code reconstruction, and we implement a malicious compiler which demonstrate the feasibility of our attack, capable of achieving an increase up to 39% of success rate measured across acoustic, power, vibration, and electromagnetic side-channels compared to the traditional attack models [11] , [12] , [13] that rely only on snooping the side-channels. Our work proves the feasibility of attacks carried out by using altered tool chains which can cause large financial loss to manufacturing industry. Future works will explore the role of other variables that control parameters of 3D printers and the fusion of multiple sidechannels to improve the G/M-code recovery capability.
